Sunday, July 24, 2005
Super CoffeeMix - A Case Study
- Added in Q305 Results on 15-Jan-06 (Released on 8-Nov-05)
- Sold my entire stake on 22-Aug-05 after it went xd. Reasons,
- Switch to other stocks as mkt has dropped but not Super CoffeeMix
- Price of Super CoffeeMix is artificially supported due to Mr Goi's purchases
- NAV is $0.334, may drop to that level without support of Mr Goi
- Added in 1H05 data into table on 8-Aug-05. For my comments on the results, see blog, Bullrun
Background
I have been holding Super CoffeeMix shares since the mid-90s @ $0.79. I had a quick look on their past 5 years results and ratios from the periodical 'Shares Investment' and their 2004 Annual Report and had bought @ $0.44 on 22-Jul to average my cost down to $0.515. This stock is very illiquid and the price range is $0.405~$0.465 for the past 1yr.
This study will help me decide on whether to add Super CoffeeMix to my portfolio or to get rid of it completely.
Financial Data
All the data in this case study are extracted fm the Super CoffeeMix 2004 Annual Report. Some of the figures in the fllwg table are extracted fm the periodical "Shares Investment",
Super CoffeeMix | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | Q105 | Q205 | Q305 | 1H05 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Margin (%) | 7.78 | 7.58 | 12.08 | 14.49 | 20.68 | 14.35 | -- | 17.65 |
ROE (%) | 5.73 | 5.64 | 9.31 | 11.96 | ----- | ----- | -- | ----- |
DIV (S$) | 0.0063 | 0.008 | 0.008 | 0.012 | ----- | 0.006 | ----- | 0.006 |
EPS (S$) | 0.014 | 0.014 | 0.026 | 0.037 | 0.016 | 0.010 | 0.0108 | 0.026 |
Turnover (S$M) | 117.25 | 116.22 | 143.76 | 176.88 | 44.45 | 40.91 | 50.947 | 85.36 |
Cash + Bank Bal (S$M) | ? | 14.90 | 35.35 | 35.44 | ? | ? | 33.089 | 33.38 |
Short Term Investment (S$M) | ? | - | - | - | ? | ? | -- | - |
Current Liabilities - Bank Borrowings (S$M) | ? | 7.71 | 9.54 | 1.538 | ? | ? | 2.182 | 0.654 |
Long Term Bank Borrowings (S$M) | ? | 14.95 | 16.29 | 2.457 | ? | ? | 1.941 | 3.231 |
NAV / Share (S$) | ? | 0.243 | 0.266 | 0.311 | 0.328 | 0.334 | 0.3417 | 0.334 |
Substantial Hldgs
- Chip Lian Investment (Oei Hong Leong) 12.48%
- Goi Seng Hui (Popiah King) + Tee Yih Jia Food Mfg = 12.24% + 4.16% = 16.4%
- Te Lay Hoon 10.99% + 2.66% (Nominee) = 13.65%
- Teo Kee Bock 6.34% + 6.08% (Nominee) = 12.42%
- Te Kok Chew 2.88%% + 7.69% (Nominee) = 10.57%
- Te + Teo Family (Original Founders) = 13.65% + 12.42% + 10.57% = 36.64%
- Ng Ser Mian 2.64%
- Free Float 28%
- Business : ASEAN 55% , S'pore 29.9% , East Asia 7.6% , Others 7.5%
- Placement of New Shares
- Jan-04 : $5.02Mil @ $0.45 to Oei Hong Leong (22.51Mil), Goi Seng Hui (12.51Mil) and Ng Ser Miang (10Mil)
- Dec-03 (Reduce Bank Borrowings) : 20Mil @ $0.33
- Feb-03 (Owl Acquisition) : 39.1 Mil @ $0.27 - NAV $0.3285 (Q1-05) , PE 12.2 & Yield 2.7% @ Share Price $0.435 on 8-Jul
- Acquired Owl Int'l (competitor) in '03 and Super Continental (coffee powder & creamer) in '04
- Manufacturing contract for P&G in M'sia for Pringles Potato chips
Comments
- Improving fundamentals
Margin - Improving fm 7% in '01 to 14% in '04 but still looks low
ROE - Improving fm 5.7% in '01 to ~12% in '04
Dividend Cover - Increasing fm 2x in '01 to 4x in '04 means more profits being channelled back to biz
Low bank borrowings - Likely due to capital raised from new shares placement - Oei & Goi likely to be friendly investors as new shares were placed to them
Goi - Also in food biz (Tee Yee Jih Food Mfg), may have good synergy
Oei - Has good China contacts and may help expand China biz (E Asia only 7.6% now) - Strategic Acquisitions
Competitor (Owl) - Likely consolidate mkt and improve mkt share
Supplier (Super Continental) - Vertical Integration will help to reduce cost and improve profit margins
Conclusions
Be warned, the above has been created to justify my recent additional buy of Super CoffeeMix shares. This will be intended for long term hold as Super CoffeeMix looks like a growth stock. Daily trading volume is very low, so it's not recommended for those who may need to sell in the short term as you may not be able to sell at a good price.
My Action
- To take a look at the different SuperCoffeeMix products and competing products next time I go to NTUC Fairprice
- To do taste test and informal mkt survey with family and friends
- To acquire more shares on price weakness. But, will also very likely sell even for $0.005 gain :D
Share Price
- 1mth : $0.435-$0.455
- 3mth : $0.425-$0.46
- 1yr : $0.405-$0.465
Disclaimer : Use the above at your own risk! We'll not be responsible for any losses incurred but you can give us credit if you make money :D
Addendum
- 28-Jul-05 : Goi Seng Hui - From 16.47 % To 16.54 % (Open Mkt Purchase)
- 19-Jul-05 : Goi Seng Hui - From 16.45 % To 16.47 % (Open Mkt Purchase)
- 1-Aug-05 : Goi Seng Hui - From 16.54 % To 16.543 % (Open Mkt Purchase)
- 8-Aug-05 : Q2/05 Results (Added figures to table above)
- 10-Aug-05 : Goi Seng Hui - From 16.543 % to 16.58% (Open Mkt Purchase - 200,000)
- 16-Aug-05 : Goi Seng Hui - From 16.58 % to 16.60% (Open Mkt Purchase - 99,000)
- 17-Aug-05 : Goi Seng Hui - From 16.60 % to 16.61% (Open Mkt Purchase - 31,000)
- 29-Aug-05 : Goi Seng Hui - From 16.61 % to 16.637% (Open Mkt Purchase - 124,000)
- 8-Nov-05 : Q305 Results / Press Release
- 6-Dec-05 : Wuxi Joint Venture
- 13-Dec-05 : PRC Property Joint Venture
Hmmm.... Without the support of Mr Goi, I think Super CoffeeMix share price would have dropped lower :D
Sunday, July 17, 2005
Suntec REIT - A Case Study
After hitting a peak of $1.32 on 6-7 Jun, the price of Suntec shares has dropped gradually, till an intra-day low of $1.15 on 15-Jul. This study will look into possible reasons for the drop by examining,
- Why are there so many impending REIT launches (MapleTree, Prime, CentrePoint)?
- Are REITs in general losing market favour, with the yield now 4-5%?
- Are investors switching from Suntec REIT to other REITs? If so, what are the reasons?
- Are investors dumping Suntec REITs in anticipation of the newer REITs that will be launched with better yields, like Mapletree?
Why So Many Impending REIT Launches?
When REIT was first started in Singapore, the yields were much higher at 7-8% and they were offered at a discount to NAV. Even then, there were few takers and it took 1-2 years before investors started to chase the prices up, till the current yield of 4-5% and even at a premium to NAV. The reasons for the surge in market interest in REITs are likely,
- Poor stock market returns prior to 2005
- Low bank interest rate (1.5% for FD even now)
- Good track record of the pioneer REITs, CMT and A-REIT
After CMT and A-REIT, the market demand have been positive for subsequent IPOs of CCT (issued only to Capitaland shareholders), Fortune and Suntec. New units issued by exisiting REITs had also been easily abosrbed by investors.
Thus, many organisations have announced their intent to launch REITs and this includes MapleTree, Prime and CentrePoint Properties. I also believe many organisations are expecting the good times to end soon (for REITs) as we see improving GDP growth (which means investors may switch to growth stocks) and increasing Fed interest rates (4-5% REIT yield becomes unattractive if bank interest rate goes up) ie. they will not be able to price their IPO as high if they delay it.
Are REITs Losing Market Favour?
Although Suntec prices has been dropping, that of CMT and A-REIT has been appreciating while those of CCT (despite Temasek off-loading their stake to the mkt) and Fortune (despite new units being issued) had remained steady.
The forecasted yield for the local REITs is 4-5%. Suntec yield is the 2nd best (Fortune is top as it's considered riskier with assets in HK) at aro' 5% for current mkt price of $1.16.
But, I think 4-5% yield is getting unattractive. With T-Bills now at 2%, the margin of safety is only 2-3%. The only way for the yield to improve would be for the REIT to increase their rental or to acquire yield acreditive assets. The former will need time to carry out as most tenants are on 2-3yrs lease and would very much depend on the health of the economy. For the latter, the impact on the yield gets smaller as the REIT grows in size. The other way would be for the share price to drop, which is what is happening now with Suntec.
Thus, watch out for the bank interest rate. If the risk-free rate were to go up further, you may be left carrying the baby :D
Are Investors Switching from Suntec REIT to Other REITs?
It would appear so as only the price of Suntec is dropping. In terms of biz structure, the closest competitor is CMT, with its focus on shopping malls (Suntec has a portfolio of Malls + Office). The different price direction of Suntec and CMT does appear to indicate that investors are switching from Suntec to CMT.
There were also recent news that CMT may acquire Bugis Junction and thus regain its No.1 REIT position from Suntec. CMT also enjoys having a strong parent, whereas Suntec do not have any dominant shareholder. In another country, investors would have love Suntec for the same fact :D
I believe the price drop in Suntec is also likely due to their silence (2 weeks now) on their recent acquisitions. Investors who are sitting on good profits from the $1 IPO launch are likely taking profit due to the uncertainties of,
- Are Suntec over-paying for the acquisitions?
- How much yield is it acreditive?
- How are Suntec going to fund the new acquisitions? How many more new shares to be offered and at what discounts?
Based on publicly available info, I believe the above are the main reasons why many investors are switching from Suntec to CMT.
Are investors dumping Suntec REITs in anticipation of the newer REITs that will be launched with better yield?
There will likely be an impact, esp. if the newer REITs offer 6-6.5%, which is better than what Suntec yield now. In fact, it should impact all currently listed REITs which have lower yields. But, I think what will likely happen is that the new REITs' price will appreciate when it's listed till the yield is closer to 5%.
Currently, most of the listed REITs (except Suntec vs CMT) are focussed on the different property sectors and thus enjoys some share price protection. However, the impending launches of newer REITs will definitely change the landscape.
- MapleTree (Logistics Assets) may impact A-REIT more
- Prime (Ngee Ann City) may impact Suntec and CMT more
- F&N (CentrePoint) may impact Suntec and CMT more
Thus, the Shopping Malls REITs does appear to be under a bigger threat as investors are going to be spoiled for choices. We may even be seeing this impact now as investors appears to be favouring CMT vs Suntec.
Announcements / News
- 22-Apr ($1.22) : Metro accepts Suntec offer for Ngee Ann City
- 27-Apr ($1.22) : Suntec REIT's DPU Exceeds Forecast by 5.7%
- 4-May ($1.23) : ERGO offer accepted by Metro
- 6/7-Jun ($1.32) : Peaked. Run up fm 1-Jun @ $1.24
- 10-Jun ($1.28) : Mr Li Ka Shing sold Suntec till 4.947% (63,774,300). Dropped till 13-Jun @ $1.25
- 15-Jun ($1.25) : Fortune Real Estate Investment Trust ("Fortune REIT"), is issuing 318,796,148 new units in Fortune REIT ("New Units") at a price of HK$6.23 per New Unit.
- 17-Jun ($1.25) : Temasek offloads CCT @ $1.50
- 21-Jun ($1.25) : Suntec REIT may be feeling added pressure on a report in the Business Times that its tenant UBS has signed a lease for 10 floors or 200,000 square feet of the 50-story north tower of the One Raffles Quay office building that is being constructed at the new Marina Bay downtown area. Dropped to $1.21 on 29-Jun
- 29-Jun ($1.21) : BT reports Suntec REIT is close to buying 1 bln sgd worth of office and commercial properties from Wing Tai and City Developments
- 30-Jun ($1.22): Suntec REIT said it is buying a total of 12 properties from City Developments and Wing Tai for about 1.03 bln sgd, making it the largest real estate investment trust by asset size and net lettable area in the city state
- 7-Jul ($1.22) : Ergo is on track to raise about S$500m selling shares in the new Prime REIT next month. The listing is likely to be in mid-August. Prime REIT owns about S$1.3b of retail and office properties in Orchard Road. Prime REIT's gearing is likely to be about 31% (Debt/ Assets) and the trust will likely distribute 5.11 cents per share in 2005 and 5.24 cents per share in 2006.
- 12-Jul : BT report on CMT possible deal on acquiring Bugis Junction. Price dropped fm $1.22 on 11-Jul close to a $1.16 on 15-Jul
- 15-Jul : News report that MapleTree will do a press release on 18-Jul
Comments
- Looking at the Price vs News data, it'd appear that Suntec prices ran up fm $1.24 on 1-Jun and peaked at $1.32 on 6/7-Jun while Mr Li is selling down his stake. When it was announced on 10-Jun that Mr Li's stake is below 5%, the price drops back to original levels of $1.25 on 13-Jun.
- The BT report on 21-Jun abt Suntec losing a key tenant also appears to cause Suntec price to drop further to $1.21 on 29-Jun. The arrest on the drop is due to another BT report on Suntec being close to acquiring seets from CDL and Wing Tai, which was subsequently confirmed on 30-Jun.
- Another round of price decline started on 11-Jul fm $1.22 to $1.16 on 15-Jul. This appears to be due to the BT report on 12-Jul abt CMT possibly acquiring Bugis Junction and regaining the No.1 REIT position.
- Both Suntec & CMT dropped on 15-Jul and this could have been triggered by the news of the MapleTree press release this coming 18-Jul.
If you look at the Suntec vs CMT price chart below, there appears to be a delayed inverse correlation starting from 4-Jul when CMT starts going up while that of Suntec started to decline on 5-Jul followed by a sharper decline on 11-Jul.
It does appear that the Prime REIT announcement on 7-Jul and the report on 12-Jul on CMT possibly acquiring Bugis Junction are the main causes of the recent price decline of Suntec.
The news of MapleTree planning a news release on 18-Jul may have contributed to the decline on 15-Jul.
The earlier price boost in B/Jun followed by its decline is likely triggered by the selling of Mr Li's stake in Suntec to below 5%.
Hmmm... BT also seems to have a very strong influence on the price of Suntec :D
Reference : REIT News Posted at BullRun
Disclaimer : The above conclusions are drawn using publicly available info. I may also have missed out other available info. Please do not solely rely on the above to make any investment decision.
Raffles Holdings - A Case Study
Background
I received the fllwg email fm my Philips broker on 27-Jun,
SINGAPORE (XFN-ASIA) - BNP Paribas said it has an "overweight" rating for the hotel and leisure sector here, as it is expected to benefit from increased tourist arrivals this year. "Latest tourism data showed visitor arrivals were up 8.1 pct year-on-year in the first five months of 2005, with room rates up 10.6 pct on average. Expect stronger numbers for the remaining months of 2005," BNP analyst Vincent Yek said in a note. Yek said that the current prices of stocks like City Developments Ltd, CapitaLand and Ascott Group have not fully factored-in expectations of further improvement in hotel room rates, occupancy levels and revenue per available room (RevPAR). "We should see values for hotels improving over the next three years as earnings pick up," he said.
Yek said that Raffles Holdings Ltd remains his top pick in the sector, and that he has raised its target price to 0.93 sgd from 0.81 sgd. "Based on our own market survey, the 4-star and 5-star hotels' RevPAR improved faster than average industry RevPAR. Raffles Holdings owns mainly 5-star hotels and should see revenue improve faster than industry average for first half 2005," Yek said.
At 11.11 am, Raffles Holdings was down 0.015 sgd at 0.665, Capitaland was down 0.02 at 2.34, City Developments was down 0.15 at 7.70 and Ascott was down 0.005 at 0.46.
I have Raffles Hldgs stocks since IPO in Dec-99 @ $0.85 and a subsequent buy @ $0.76. With the capital reduction exercise of $0.18 last year, my average cost is $0.625. I thot' I was underwater till I checked and found out that I have not factored in the capital reduction of last year :D
The purpose of this study is thus to decide whether to hold and even build up my holdings or to get rid of it entirely.
Financial Data
All the data in this case study are extracted fm the Raffles Hldgs 2004 Annual Report. Some of the figures in the fllwg table are extracted fm the periodical "Shares Investment",
Raffles Hldgs | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | Q105 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Margin (%) | 68.11 | 15.89 | 17.24 | 14.01 | 12.32 |
ROE (%) | 13.05 | 2.39 | 2.84 | 3.82 | ----- |
DIV (S$) | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | ----- |
EPS (S$) | 0.119 | 0.022 | 0.026 | 0.029 | 0.005 |
Turnover (S$M) | 358.6 | 385.3 | 420.1 | 527.8 | 138.6 |
Cash + Bank Bal (S$M) | ? | ? | 249.4 | 126.9 | - |
Short Term Investment (S$M) | ? | ? | 121.3 | 0 | - |
Current Liabilities - Bank Borrowings (S$M) | ? | ? | 95.3 | 99.9 | - |
Long Term Bank Borrowings (S$M) | ? | ? | 181.7 | 267.4 | - |
Net Tangible Asset / Share (S$) | 0.89 | 0.89 | 0.91 | 0.74 | - |
Note : Capital Reduction $375Mil ($0.18/shr) on May-04
Issued Shares = 2,085,980,852 @ $0.32 par
Substantial Hldgs :
- Capitaland 59.89%
- OCBC 7.81%
- DBS 3.24%
- Free Float 27.94%
Highlights
- Business : Hotels & Resorts (99.8%)
- NAV = $0.78 (14.7% discount) vs Share Price $0.67 (8-Jul)
- PE 23.3, Yield 3.0% @ $0.67 (8-Jul)
Comments
- Improving Turnover, EPS & ROE fm 2002-04
- Debts increased & Cash reduced due to capital reduction in 2004
- Total debts $367Mil still lower than HPL ($513Mil)
- Cash + S/T Investments $127Mil also higher than HPL ($67Mil)
- ROE ave ~3% for last 3 yrs does appear low but still higher than HPL (1.5% ave)
- Margin ave ~15% for last 3yrs higher than HPL (8-9% ave)
- EPS ave 2.5cts for last 3 yrs lower than HPL (3.5cts ave) but due to 4x as many shares
- NAV at much lower discount of 14.7% vs HPL 38.6%
Conclusion
Raffles Hldgs appear to be a better choice as compared to HPL in terms of most of the fundamentals analysed above. HPL however offers a much better discount to NAV. Thus, the share price of Raffles Hldgs may go up on improving fundamentals while that of HPL may go up due to potential unlocking of its NAV.
Here, you have to choose between an outfit controlled by a GLC (or TLC) and managed by hired professionals vs one controlled and run by family.
The negative abt Raffles Hldgs is the large holding by Capitaland of ~60% and the small free float of ~28% (altho' it may be mitigated by the large nos. of issued shares).
Action
Based on this short study, I'm currently more inclined to not only hold on to my existing shares but will likely add on, for long term hold.
Announcements
- 27-Jun : Raffles City Shopping Centre Embarks on 50,000 sq ft B1 Extension
- 28-Apr : Q1-05 Results
Disclaimer : Use the above at your own risk! We'll not be responsible for any losses incurred but you can give us credit if you make money :D
Thursday, July 14, 2005
HPL - A Case Study
NOTE : As of 14-Jul, I hv sold off my stake at $1.43 and will suspend this study unless HPL drops below $1.30 :D
Background
HPL, at $1.37 is trading at a 38.6% discount to NAV ($2.23). Trading volume is usually low and the stable price is aro' $1.20 for the most part of the year. Over the years, there has been regular spike up in volumes and price, esp. when rumours arises of the Quek family (Hong Leong Group) planning to do a takeover of HPL. The Queks now holds a deemed interest of 21.24%. Recently, with the demise of Mr Fu YS, we start to see another run up of HPL, which closes at $1.46 on 11-Jul.
This study will try to examine the following,
- Is HPL undervalued, as per its large discount to NAV
- Is there a likelihood of a change in ownership, esp. with the passing of Mr Fu
Financial Data
All the data in this case study are extracted fm the HPL 2004 Annual Report. Some of the figures in the fllwg table are extracted fm the periodical "Shares Investment",
HPL | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | Q105 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Margin (%) | 12.20 | 7.93 | 5.12 | 11.86 | 9.60 |
ROE (%) | 4.32 | 1.75 | 0.51 | 2.17 | ----- |
DIV (S$) | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.025 | 0.05 | ----- |
EPS (S$) | 0.086 | 0.035 | 0.010 | 0.047 | 0.010 |
Turnover (S$M) | 511.6 | 348.2 | 279.8 | 320.1 | 71.2 |
Cash + Bank Bal (S$M) | ? | ? | 84.35 | 63.57 | - |
Short Term Investment (S$M) | ? | ? | 6.43 | 3.89 | - |
Current Liabilities - Bank Borrowings (S$M) | ? | ? | 28.39 | 43.42 | - |
Long Term Bank Borrowings (S$M) | ? | ? | 543.4 | 470.2 | - |
Net Current Asset (S$M) | ? | ? | 78.53 | 53.26 | - |
Issued Shares = 453,024,410 @ $1 Par
Substantial Hldgs :
- Peter Fu YS - 21.92%
- Ong BS - 22.61%
- Peter Fu CC - 14.13%
- Kuo Investment - 6.85%
- Hong Leong Investment (ie Quek Family) - 21.24%
- Free Float - 32.41%
Highlights
- Business : Hotels (88.2%) , Properties (5.7%), Retail (6.2%)
- NAV = $2.23 vs Share Price $1.21 (27-Jun) - $1.46 (11-Jul)
- PE 29.9, Yield 1.8% @ $1.41 (8-Jul)
- Large bank borrowings >$500Mil, ie highly geared and D/E doesn't look good
Comments
- I don't like the look of the large bank borrowings even tho' a large part of it is long term
- HPL has carved out a corner by itself between Orchard Rd n Tanglin area where they hv their condo, hotel, shopping mall, Hard Rock Cafe,... but I don't see that area being a very vibrant part of town.
- Some of their hotels has been hit by natural calamities, like tsunami in Bali, Mauritius. Also in terrorist areas(?)
- Looked at Stamford Land (Hotel - 92.9% , Property Devt & Investment - 2.9%)
- NAV $0.48 (46.9% Discount @ Share Price $0.255) ; PE 15.5 ; Yield 5.9%
- Borrowings $253.2Mil ; Cash + S/T Investment = $63.4Mil
- 2005 : Turnover 215.91Mil ; EPS 1.6cts ; Div 1.5cts (2001-05)
- 862,833,482 Shares @ $0.10 par ; Ow Chio Kiat 32.24% Free Float 62.73%
- Similar industry, same High Discount to NAV and Large Borrowings but Better Yield, PE
- Biz concentrated in Australia + NZ vs HPL Aseans and others
Preliminary Conclusion
The Queks are unlikely to make a move soon as they are busy with the takeover of BIL. Also, like what the papers mentioned, the estate of Mr Peter Fu will take a while to settle. Thus recent price run-up may not be sustainable, so it's better to sell at $1.4x and try to buy back at $1.2x if I can find good reasons to hold this stock. Initial comparison with a similar co., Stamford Land (am vested in CPF, got it fm split of HSH to Stamford + SSC long ago but is below split price since then) seems to show Stamford may be a better stock to buy! I always thought HPL is a much bigger co. but looking at their turnover, that doesn't seem so.
I was vested at $1.90 fm Sep-97. Only a very small hldgs and I can't even remember why I bought it back then. But sold off on 14-Jul-05 after drawing the above preliminary conclusion.
Possible Future Scenarios :
- Fu Junior sells off stakes to Ong
Comment - Prob bad for shareholders with HPL share price at status quo - Fu Junior sells off stake to Quek family
Comment - May be good for shareholders as Quek unlocks value in HPL shares - HPL gets taken over by/merge with M&C or other Hotel co.
Comment - Will definitely be good for shareholders but unlikely to happen
Announcements :
- 3-Jul ($1.29) : Demise of Founder and Chairman, Mr Peter Fu Yun Siak on 2-Jul
- $1.29 on 1-Jul rises to $1.35 (4-Jul) and continue to rise and peak at $1.46 (11-Jul) - 19-May ($1.32) : Sale of Concorde Hotel, Gold Coast @ A$ 27.5 million. The Company is of the view that it is timely for the HPL Group to realize its investment in the Property and deploy the funds for other new investment opportunities. Suseem will record a total gross gain of approximately A$ 11.2 million (or approximately S$14 million based on the current exchange rate of A$ 1.00 : S$ 1.25) arising from the sale of the Property.
- $1.35 (20-May) and peak at $1.37 (24-May) - 11-May ($1.38) : Unaudited First Quarter Financial Statement for the Period Ended 31 March 2005
- $1.42 (12-May) - 3-May ($1.47) : Withdrawal of bid for IR
- $1.52 (4-May) before sliding down till low of $1.18 (6-Jun) - 26-Apr ($1.57) : Announcement of Joint Bid for IR with Metro
- Run up fm B/05 and peaked at $1.60 (27-Apr) - 23-Feb ($1.29) : Full Year Audited Results
- On the uptrend since B/05 and continue to rise after announcement - 8-Nov-04 ($1.06) : 3rd Q Results
- Price goes up and peaked at$1.20 (3-Dec)
Disclaimer : Use the above at your own risk! We'll not be responsible for any losses incurred but you can give us credit if you make money :D
Metro - A Case Study
Note :
- 15-Feb-05 : Adding in data for Q305 Results
- 13-Nov-05 : Added in data for Q206 Results
- 16-Aug-05 : Added in data for Q106 Results
Background
Metro, at $0.515 is trading at a 37.8% discount to NAV ($0.828) and has a large cash hoard. Trading volume is usually low and the share price is bound within $0.45-$0.50 although it'll spike up once a while with heavy volume, esp. aro' Mid and Full Year Reporting time when investors expects Metro to declare a special dividend (due to large cash hoard).
This study will examine the following,
- Is Metro undervalued ?
- Will Metro return its large cash hoard to shareholders ?
This study will be continuously updated as and when data is available.
Financial Data
All the data in this case study are extracted fm the Metro 2005 Annual Report. Some of the figures in the fllwg table are extracted fm the periodical "Shares Investment",
Metro | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | Q106 | Q206 | Q306 |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Margin (%) | 10.53 | 13.31 | 18.98 | 96.12 | 19.85 | ? | ? | ? |
ROE (%) | 2.82 | 4.83 | 6.51 | 42.79 | 5.10 | ? | ? | ? |
DIV (S$) | 0.009 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.17 | 0.02 | ------ | ------ | ------ |
EPS (S$) | 0.0346 | 0.0425 | 0.0610 | 0.3529 | 0.0492 | 0.0175 | 0.1915 | 0.0093 |
Turnover (S$M) | 258.1 | 259.8 | 254.3 | 233.1 | 203.7 | 49.23 | 42.266 | 60.966 |
NTA / Share (S$) | 0.84 | 0.88 | 0.94 | 0.82 | 0.97 | 100.3 | 101.2 | 101.5 |
Cash + Bank Bal (S$M) | ? | ? | ? | 229.8 | 144.4 | 191.7 | 269.92 | 264.32 |
Short Term Investment (S$M) | ? | ? | ? | 29.2 | 44.4 | 75.3 | 67.432 | 63.658 |
Current Liabilities - Bank Borrowings (S$M) | ? | ? | ? | 32.5 | 62.3 | 56.2 | 62.719 | 56.317 |
Long Term Bank Borrowings (S$M) | ? | ? | ? | 47.1 | 33.2 | 45.6 | 44.219 | 89.311 |
Net Current Asset (S$M) | ? | ? | ? | 253.1 | 170.3 | 223.9 | 284.679 | 269.793 |
Issued Shares = 630,776,676 @ $0.20 Par
Note (1) : Bonus Issue 1-for-5 on 22-Aug-02 ;
Note (2) : 2004 (Mar04 is Financial Year End) has extraordinary gains fm Ngee Ann City
Note (3) : S$86.72M (~$0.1375 cash/share) to be realised fm disposal of Junior Bonds n Pref Shares
Q206 Results
Summary
- Revenue $42.266Mil +2.04% ; Gross Profit $5.65Mil +38.04%
- Operating Profit after Tax $120.188Mil +2109.74% (Exceptional Item $119.16Mil)
- Segment Profit : Property $1.611Mil ; Retail $1.103Mil
- Forex Gain $0.95Mil ; Interest $1.848Mil ; Dividend $5.115Mil+$1.137Mil
- NAV 101.2cts (up fm 100.3cts)
Review
- Group turnover for the second financial quarter to 30 September 2005 rose to $42.3 million from $41.4 million previously, as rental income from Metro City grew.
- The disposal of the junior bonds and preference shares of Orchard Square Capital Assets Ltd ("OSCAL") in August 2005, resulted in the exceptional gains of $118 million and accounted for most of the increase in profit before tax from $7.0 million to $121.9 million. The exceptional gain of $118 million, includes the realisation of $100.2 million, being the balance of prior years’ revaluation surpluses relating to the Group’s 27% interest in Ngee Ann City.
- Higher rental income from Metro City accounted for the improvement in the property division’s revenue for the quarter from $7.1 million to $7.8 million. The impact of this improvement and higher dividend income from unquoted investments was offset by provisions for performance bonuses of $6.6 million, included under general and administrative expenses, arising from the higher profit before tax due to the exceptional gains. Excluding these provisions, the property segment’s operating results for the current financial quarter would have been $8.2 million against the $1.6 million recorded.
- Although lower promotional activities in the quarter resulted in flat sales for the retail division, the consequential lower costs of discounts meant margins improved. The retail division’s operating profit therefore rose from $0.3 million to $1.1 million for the financial quarter.
- With the sale of the junior bonds and preference shares of OSCAL, the carrying value of Associated companies fell from $154.2 million as at 30 June 2005 to $82.7 million as at 30 September 2005. The proceeds received of $86.7 million from the disposal, accounted for the increase in cash and bank balances from $191.7 million to $269.9 million as at 30 September 2005. Investments (non-current assets) also rose $13.6 million with the disbursement of shareholders loans in connection with the investment in Hualing International Commerce and Trade Plaza. There were no other material factors that affected the cashflow, working capital, assets and liabilities of the Group during the current financial quarter reported on.
Going Forward
- The Group’s properties are expected to continue to report incremental improvements in performance in the next financial quarter. It will also continue to reflect steady growth in the flow of income arising from other investments. This will assist to offset the impact of the cessation of interest income from the disposal of the junior bonds of OSCAL.
- With the more positive outlook for the Singapore economy, consumer spending during the upcoming festive shopping season is likely to improve.
Q106 Results
Summary
- Revenue $49,226Mil +11.57% ; Gross Profit $5.328Mil +11.6%
- Operating Profit after Tax $11.884Mil +144.53%
- Segment Profit : Property $13.359Mil ; Retail $0.507Mil
- Other Income $12.773Mil +$140.5Mil
- Forex Gain $5.397Mil ; Interest $2.544Mil ; Dividend $0.408Mil+$1.965Mil
- NAV 100.3cts (up fm 96.6cts)
Q106 Review
- Group turnover for the three months to 30 June 2005 rose 11.6% from $44.1 million to $49.2 million mainly due to higher sales reported by the retail division.
- Higher rental income from Metro City, arising from an improvement in the tenant mix and other asset enhancement exercises, accounted for the increase in the property division’s revenue for the quarter from $9.1 million to $10.3 million. The completion of the disposal of The Oasis Resort and the consequent conversion of Australian dollar assets to Singapore dollar assets resulted in a realized exchange gain of $4.7 million which raised the property division’s operating results. Dividend and other income from investments including the unquoted investment in Shui On Land Limited, also drove the property division’s improvement in operating results. The net outcome was a rise in the property division’s operating results from $5.8 million to $13.4 million.
- Higher sales from the Metro Anniversary Sales and the Great Singapore Sales as compared with the corresponding period of the previous financial year, helped the retail division to improve on sales turnover which rose 11% to $38.2 million for the first quarter with a consequential increase in operating profit.
- Other than the effects of the completion of the disposal of The Oasis Resort, the disbursement of the balance of the investment in Shui On Land Ltd and the collection of the final balance of 5%, being $26.9 million, due on the disposal of the Group’s 27% interest in Ngee Ann City in 2003, during the quarter, there were no material factors that affected the cashflow, working capital, assets and liabilities of the Group during the current financial quarter reported on.
- The disposal of the junior bonds and preference shares of Orchard Square Capital Assets Ltd was completed on 5 August 2005. The financial effects as set out in the Circular dated 6 July 2005 will therefore be reported in the next financial quarter. Income arising from other investments and performance of the Group’s properties are expected to remain stable.
- With the economic climate steadily improving, consumer spending should continue to show incremental improvement. However, competition remains keen for the retail division.
Highlights : 2005 Result
- Revenue : Property 21% Retail 78% (4 stores in S'pore, 4 in Indonesia via associate)
- Operating Profit : Property 82% ($17.7M in 2004 ; $29.9M in 2005)
- Exceptional Items : 2005 - $4.9M ; 2004 - $203.6M ($230.1 fm Ngee Ann City)
- Total Group Assets : $813.5M (fm $696.7M) ; 48% in China (fm 32%)
- Property : Shui Onn Land (Shanghai - Real Estate Developer), Wholesale Trading Centre (Xinjiang) + 4 Retail cum Office (Shanghai x 2, Guangzhou, Penang)
Calculation on Cash/Share
- In the fllwg computations, long term investments and other assets/liabilities will not be considered
- Total Cash that can be realised in Short Term
= Cash + Bank Bal + Short Term Investment + Cash fm Sale of Bonds
= $269.92M + $67.432M (Q106 : $191.7M + $75.3M + 86.72M ; FY05 : $144.4M + $44.4M + $86.72M)
= $337.352M or $0.5348/shr (Q106 : $353.72M or $0.5608/shr ; FY05 : $275.52M or $0.4368/shr) - Total Bank Borrowings
= Long Term Bank Borrowings + Short Term Bank Borrowings
= $62.719M + $44.219M (Q106 : $56.2M + $45.6M ; FY05 : $62.3M + $33.2M )
= $106.938M (Q106 : $101.8M ; FY05 : $95.5M) - Balance Cash
= Total Cash that can be realised in Short Term - Total Bank Borrowings
= $337.352M - $106.938M (Q106 : $353.72M - $101.8M ; FY05 : $275.52M - $95.5M )
= $230.415M or $0.3653/shr (Q106 : 251.92M or $0.3994/shr ; FY05 : $180.02M or $0.2854/shr )
Comments
- Metro is expanding (evolving?) fm Retail to Investment Property biz using cash fm disposal of Ngee Ann City
- Focus shifting fm ASEAN to China
- Current benefits - Improved Margins and ROE
- Danger - Mainly driven by China property boom
- Large cash hoard - May not return much to shareholders as likely required for expanding Investment Property biz
- Share Price at high discount (38%) to NTA/share but prob also similar to Property cos. like Stamford Land (47%), MCL (39%, also has huge cash hoard), HPL (38%), .... Yes, Metro is undervalued but similar in characteristics to other Property cos. (but most do not have a large component of valuation in cash)
- Major Shareholders : Ong Family 35.64% (Jopie Ong Deemed 29.23% , Ong Tjoe Kim 6.41%), Ngee Ann Kongsi 9.08% , Free Float 50.46% , so don't hope for 3rd party to 'help' realise value of Metro
Current mkt price is $0.52 (was aro' $0.50 but went up due to div payout of $0.02 soon), so it works out to a yield of ~4%
Conclusion
The question is thus whether u see Metro as a Retail or Investment Property co. If Retail, then yes, it's hard to understand why they are sitting on so much cash. They don't need a lot of cash to expand their Retail biz, unless they want to own the Retail space. If you view Metro as more of a Property Investment co., then they do need a lot of cash to invest in properties (can of course also use borrowings but will incur interest expenses).
Their recent devt do point towards the latter and I don't expect Metro to return a lot of cash to the shareholders unless they run out of properties to invest in or they decide to inject their investment properties into an REIT (current mkt fever).
Note : In their Circular to Shareholders regarding the disposal of these bonds and pref shares, on the 'Use of net proceeds', there's no mention of paying any special div to shareholders. They did mention,
"In line with the current focus and strategic direction of the Group, such investments would be mainly in property or property-related concerns."
My Expections : Metro to pay a special div fm the recent sale of Junior bonds n pref shares to appease shareholders
- 2004 : $230M Extraordinary Gain => $0.15 Special Div
- Now : $118M => $0.075~$0.10?? which works out to be $47.3M~$63M
- When : 1H06 (Sep05) ; Update : Didn't happen! Q3? or Q4??
If so, expect Metro share price to drop accordingly. In 2003, was aro' $0.65~$0.75 (hi $0.85 or so) but dropped by aro' $0.15 after it went xd.
Possible Future Scenarios :
- Metro spins off Property Assets as a different entity. Previously, Hai Sun Hup, who was mainly in Shipping, invested in Australia Hotels till their portfolio was large enough to spin it off as Stamford Land. Hai Sun Hup was also renamed as Singapore Shipping Corporation.
Comment - May be a good thing as shareholders can realign to their preferred hldgs - Metro sells off Retail assets to focus on Property Investments biz or vice versa.
Comment - If it fetches a good premium, will be good for shareholders - Ong family sells off their stake in Metro
Comment - Most unlikely to happen in the short term. If this happens, most likely will be good for shareholders as the new owner will help to unlock and realise the value of Metro
My Action
In 2003, I did several buy/sell transactions of $0.63~$0.745 and am currently hldg 2 leftover purchases of $0.745 (21-Jul-03) and $0.705 (26-Aug-03). So, at average cost of $0.725 less $0.15 special div, I am 'underwater' based on cost of $0.575 vs $0.52 (mkt price).
Now, I'll hv to decide whether to buy more for long term hold (reasonable ~4% yield and potential upside as it's 40%+ discount to NAV with lots of cash) or to average my cost down and then sell all my hldgs when mkt over-reacts due to expectation of special div :D
Update : As Metro did not declare a special interim special div, I expect the share price to correct (even tho' it's undervalued) and sold off part of my hldgs @ $0.625 on 14-Nov-05. I plan to accumulate again if it drops below $0.60.
Important Dates
- 11-Nov-05 : 1H06 Results
- 15-Aug-05 : Q106 Results ($0.53 -> $0.545)
- 12-Aug-05 : Div Pay Out Date
- 28-Jul-05 : Div Ex-Date
- 22-Jul-05 : AGM
Announcements
- 20-May : Full Year Result and Dividend Announcement ($0.515)
- 3-May : Acceptance by ERGO for sale of Bonds and Pref Shares
- 3-May : Joint Announcement with HPL on decision not to proceed on IR bid. Price plunge to $0.51
- 26-Apr : Joint Announcement with HPL on invitation to bid for IR. Price hit peak of $0.575
- 22-Apr : Disposal of Bonds and Pref Shares. Hit high of $0.545
- 19-Apr : Offer by Suntec for Bonds and Pref Shares. Rise to $0.53
- 15-Apr : Query by SGX on high trading volume. Rise to $0.52
- 7-Feb : Q3 Financial Statements and Div
- 10-Nov-04 : Q2 Financial Statements and Div
Disclaimer : Use the above at your own risk! We'll not be responsible for any losses incurred but you can give us credit if you make money :D